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Where did anthropology go? Or: The need for "Human Nature"'. 
I was recently asked the question: "Where did anthropology go?" by a 
psycholinguist from a famous American university. She was commenting 
on the fact that she had tried to establish contact with the anthropology 
department of her institution, hoping that she would find somebody who 
would contribute to a discussion of her main research interest: the relation 
of words to concepts. She had assumed that the socio-cultural 
anthropologists would have general theories or, at least, ask general 
questions, about the way children's upbringing in different cultures and 
environments would constrain, or not constrain, how children represented 
the material and the social world. She was hoping for information about 
exotic societies and about those groups, which she had already learned, 
should not be called primitive, but that is what she meant. She was hoping 
that her enquiry about a topic that is inevitable in any discussion about 
culture would be equally central to the three disciplines of psychology, 
linguistics and anthropology, and would therefore be an ideal ground for 
constructive co-operation, that is, one where the different parties could 
articulate and challenge the theories on which their different disciplines 
are built. 
In fact she found that nobody was interested in working with her, but what 
surprised her most was the hostility she perceived, caused, not only by 
the suggestion that cultural social anthropologists were interested in 
simple exotic societies, but even more by the idea that they might be 
interested in formulating and answering general questions about the 
nature of the human species or that their work could be compatible with 
disciplines such as hers. 
The lack of any generalising theoretical framework within which her 
research interest might find a place is not surprising when we look at what 
kind of thing is done in many university departments under the label social 
or cultural anthropology. Take for example the interests listed on the web 
site of the anthropology department of the University of California at 
Berkeley (which incidentally is not where our psycholinguist came from). 
Here are some: Genomics and the anthropology of modernity, Science and 
reason, The anthropologies of education, law, tourism, Food and energy, 
space and the body, Post-soviet political discourse, Violence, trauma and 
their political and subjective consequences, Social and cultural history, 
(Post) colonialism, Social mediation of mind. 
I do not intend here to criticise the value of the studies, which lie behind these 
titles. In fact, I know that many are excellent and interesting, but one need not 
be surprised that our psycholinguist got so little response to her request for a 
coherent body of theories from anthropologists. What possible core of shared 
questions and interest could departments of this sort have to which her interest 
might then be related? Furthermore, when occasionally a proposal of more 
general import is made in contemporary anthropology, as for example Nancy 
Scheper-Hughes' hypothesis, based on an example from Brazil, that grinding 
poverty leads to parents' indifference towards the death of their children, the 
matter is criticised anecdotally with ethnographic counter examples, but the 
general hypothesis is not scrutinised at the theoretical level and systematically 
tested, but is simply left to float in never never land (1992). This incoherent 
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fragmentation, in any and every direction, so long as the topics will find favour 
with funding bodies and seems relevant to the concerns of the moment, makes 
the existence of anthropology departments as working units difficult to justify 
intellectually. Indeed, this is what Eric Wolf already complained about shortly 
before his death, and led to the near destruction of anthropology at Stanford 
University. 
But are we dealing simply with a problem internal to the ways in which 
universities function, simply an accidental result of the way the discipline has 
evolved in the academy, yet another illustration of the inevitable arbitrariness 
and shift of boundaries within science? The frustrated hope on the part of our 
psycholinguist that she could obtain guidance to her questions from professional 
anthropologists might indeed seem a rather limited problem of communication 
within modern universities, where, after all, it is common for people from one 
discipline to misunderstand the nature of another. 
I shall argue today that, in fact, there is much more at stake, because the 
negative response to our psycholinguist's request for a discipline, such as what 
anthropology might reasonably be expected to be, is far from an arcane missed 
appointment, internal to the cloistered world of academia. 
Let us consider a very different situation. 
One evening, about six months ago, I was doing fieldwork in the little village of 
Ranomena. This is a place deep in the Malagasy forest, cut off from all modern 
means of communication and only reachable on foot. I was sitting in near total 
darkness in the tiny house of the family who have been my hosts, on and off, 
during several periods of field study, scattered over almost thirty years. The 
evening meal had been eaten and consequently the fire had burned down. This 
was, as is usual at this time, a rare moment of relaxation and reflection, in which 
I joined freely. The conversation soon turned, as it often did, to questions of a 
philosophical nature, though it had begun in a less general way. People had been 
imitating, remembering and making fun of the accents and the vocabularies of 
other ethnic groups in the huge and culturally very varied island of Madagascar. 
The people of the village, the men at least, are experts in linguistic and cultural 
diversity since, when they are young and vigorous, they go as wage labourers to 
many different parts of the country, where they work for several months at a 
time as woodcutters or carpenters, and where, furthermore, they are often 
employed by merchants originating from different parts of the Indian 
subcontinent. After many anecdotes about the linguistic variations they had 
encountered on their travels, the conversation rapidly took on a more theoretical 
turn. If people used different words, did they understand the phenomena they 
designated so differently in the same way? If we are all related, how had this 
variation come about? Were the speakers of unrelated languages fundamentally 
different types of moral beings? And, if they were, as some maintained, was this 
due to the language they had learnt, or was the language the manifestation of a 
deeper cause? In order to grapple with this problem the discussants proposed a 
thought experiment. What about the children of those Malagasy who had 
emigrated to France and who only spoke French? Were they in any sense really 
Malagasy in their social morality, in their ways of thinking and working and in 
their emotions? Would their skin be whiter than that of their parents? And, if not, 
as everybody seemed finally to agree, if they came back to live in Madagascar, 
would their dark skin mean that they would learn Malagasy more easily than, for 
example, I had, or the children of Europeans? Thus the question of what is learnt 
and what is innate was formulated and reformulated in many, often, completely 
abstract forms. 
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The seminar continued. 
If there was so much variation and mutability, could one say that all humans 
were one species or several? Were there discontinuities in racial and cultural 
variation or was there only a continuum? If we were all one family and, at 
bottom, all thought alike, how could it be that the histories of different groups of 
mankind had been so dissimilar and had given rise to such differences in 
technological knowledge and wealth? Why were the people from overseas, which 
the people of Ranomena tend to consider all much of a muchness, continually 
fighting, when they, by contrast, were all so peaceful? And, given that there is 
only one God (it is a Catholic village}, how could it be that in the world there are 
people like the Hindus who do such completely exotic, unthinkable things, as 
burning their dead? 
These were the questions I recorded in just one evening, but they and other 
related ones are a familiar feature of intellectual life in Ranomena. People argue 
among themselves over these matters, whether I am there or not. However, 
because I was there, and because by now, after much explaining, the villagers of 
Ranomena have some idea of the kind of subject I teach, they turned to me for 
advice and expertise. After all, as they often tell me, I had seen and read about 
many more different people in the world than they had, I had studied long and 
hard and had gathered in myself the wisdom of many other knowledgeable 
people who had been my teachers. So, what could I say about these crucial 
questions? Well, I answered as best I could. But, what strikes me most clearly, as 
I reflect on such pleasant and interesting evenings, is that my eo-villagers, in 
spite of their lack of formal education, were coming to the subject of 
anthropology with much the same questions as we might expect from anybody 
who turns to our discipline in a country such as the Netherlands, whether as 
students, as readers of learned publications, or as practitioners of other 
disciplines in the academy. Indeed, as you may have noted, the very same 
question was being asked by the psycholinguist of people who call themselve 
anthropologists as did some of the Malagasy villagers. 
The point I want to stress through these anecdotes is that there is a widespread, 
perhaps universal, demand for a subject such as anthropology and that this 
demand exists irrespective of culture, degree of education and intellectual 
tradition. People ask these questions of anthropologists because anthropology 
would seem to be the kind of discipline which might provide answers. One can 
assume that it is to get answers to questions such as those that preoccupied the 
villagers of Ranomena, that people in the Netherlands, or indeed anywhere, 
choose to study anthropology. 
But, had the villagers of Ranomena actually penetrated the portals of the 
academy, would they, then, have to face the same disappointment as our 
psycholinguist? The answer is probably yes. And, in order to understand how and 
why this state of affairs has come about I attempt here an extremely brief 
overview of the academic history of the discipline. One, which will inevitably 
involve gross oversimplification and will ignore many counter currents and eddies. 
The late nineteenth century was a time when a number of highly influential 
anthropological books were published. These purported no less than to give a 
general account of the history of humanity in terms of general evolutionary laws. 
Thus, general characteristics of human beings were seen to be the cause of 
human history, which, therefore, had a necessary and unilineal character. These 
types of books were not new, but what was new was the fact that these general 
accounts were to be supported by a scientific research enterprise, the aim of 
which was to collect empirical evidence in support of the different theories. This 
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became the justification for setting up university chairs and ultimately whole 
departments of anthropology in many European and American countries. 
The discipline was to operate a bridge between the history of life, up to the 
emergence of Homo sapiens, the subject matter of zoology, and the history of 
mankind, up to the invention of writing, by which point historians could take over. 
Evidence to account for what had happened during this gap was to come from the 
four fields approach, still evident in many contemporary anthropology 
departments in the United States. The four fields were archaeology, biological 
anthropology, linguistics and what became social and cultural anthropology. 
The role of social or cultural anthropology in this schema was to provide evidence 
for the reconstruction of the history of mankind through the study of primitive 
people. The study of these people was relevant because of a familiar, but 
fundamental, assumption. The different groups of mankind advanced along a 
single necessary line of progress, from one stage to another. Technological or 
intellectual advances were the driving force for forward movement but this was 
along a road, which was traced by the internal potential of a shared human 
nature. The itinerary regarding politics, kinship, religion, morals and anything 
else, was thus universal and what varied was how far different groups had got 
pushed along. This being so, it followed that, if one found a living contemporary 
group of people using a certain type of primitive technology, for example hunting 
and gathering, a study of their political organisation, their kinship system, their 
religion, and so on, would yield information about the politics, kinship, religion 
and morals of our distant ancestors at the time when they had reached the same 
point along that single road. By this mean, anthropology could discover the 
immaterial aspects of the life of those forebears whose material prehistory was 
being only gradually revealed by archaeology. 
This general method was shared by most anthropological accounts of the time, 
although, of course, the evidence produced in this way was far from clear and, 
therefore a number of competing accounts of the early history of mankind were 
produced. All these, however, shared an amazing confidence in the ability of the 
subject and its methods to fulfil the vast program, which it had outlined for itself. 
These theories are usually described as evolutionist or more precisely as unilineal 
evolutionist theories and they all rest on a largely unexamined and simple notion 
of human nature. 
The period about which I have been talking may be referred to as that of the 
founders of anthropology. It produced an ordered image of the history of 
mankind and of cultural and social variation. It is probably because of this that, in 
many ways, it was the heyday of anthropology's popular success. Consequently 
we may consider what happened next as its twilight. In fact, there is not one but 
there are two accounts to be told about this subsequent history of the dimming of 
the evolutionists' light. The first concerns the reputation among anthropologists of 
this moment of confidence in their subject and the other its reputation in the 
wider world beyond. It is the interaction between the two that interests me. 
Very shortly after its establishment, evolutionist anthropology was destroyed by 
an obvious but fundamental criticism, which took very different forms, but is 
always ultimately based on the same objection. This is usually called the theory 
of diffusionism. I shall use the term here much more widely than is usually done 
to stress the fact that, in spite of superficial differences, we are always dealing 
with the same point. Thus I include under the term "diffusionism", such trends as 
Geertzian culturalism and "postmodernism" which all rest on the same 
foundation. The basic point of diffusionism- the basic objection to evolutionist 
anthropology- is that human culture does not proceed along a predetermined 
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line, following a limited number of ordered stages. This is because human beings 
have the ability to learn from each other and can then pass on acquired traits 
through communication. This enables them to further build, transform, modify 
and combine what others have learnt and passed on to them. It is thus possible 
to argue, perfectly validly, if somewhat simply, that it is human contacts and 
thus, ultimately history, which, in great part, makes people what they are, rather 
than their "nature". For the diffusionists it is not fundamental essential 
characteristics of human beings that explain history but the accidents of whom 
we are with and have been with. Unlike animals to whom evolutionary laws apply 
and who are, in the long term, determined by their biological inheritance, 
humans, for their part, are determined by other individuals, in other words, they 
are determined by culture. 
The implications of focusing on the ability of humans to borrow information and 
then to pass it on to another by non genetic means is genuinely far reaching. It is 
what makes culture possible. Since people borrow cultural traits one from 
another, they can individually combine bits and pieces from different individuals. 
It follows that there are no naturally distinct social or cultural groups, tribes, 
peoples, etc. And since these combinations arise from anywhere, anybody and in 
any order, there are no general predictable laws of history. Because, unlike other 
animals, humans can transmit acquired characteristics across and within 
generations, the history of culture becomes an entangled, disordered, infinitely 
complex mess, quite unlike the ordered procession envisaged by the 
evolutionists. And since the past was this tangled directionless web, so will be the 
future; therefore it cannot be predicted. Most fundamental of all is the fact that 
diffusionist theory removes internal human nature as the determinant source of 
what happens in history and replaces it by factors which are external. It is as 
though the ability of humans to communicate and to pass on what they have 
learnt to others made all innate natural capacities irrelevant to the study of 
human history. A point of view exemplified in Geertz's uncharacteristically bad 
tempered and sarcastic lecture "Anti Anti Relativism" (Geertz 1984). 
Diffusionism was, therefore, a knock out blow against the original ambition of a 
science that was going to explain what had happened in human history in terms 
of a necessary evolutionary sequence. No subsequent theoretical criticism has 
ever had a similar impact. Indeed, the point is so fundamental that it has simply 
been repeated ever since in many different forms. The emphasis on the 
"construction" of human beings by culture, in various postmodern guises, is one 
of these, as is the consequent revulsion against so called "grand theory". 
Anthropology began by assuming that human history could be written as the 
natural history of human beings, as though we were an ordinary kind of animal 
whose behaviour was governed by the same kind of natural laws as that of other 
forms of life. This tenet was then apparently totally negated by the emphasis on 
culture, the product of constitutive communication, the producer of unpredictable 
historical particularities. Thus, unilineal evolutionary theory of human history was 
thrown out for a good reason and a totally opposite view was proposed: one in 
which people are represented as infinitely variable creatures, constructed entirely 
by the whims of innumerable accidents of communication. Animals were 
constructed by nature, humans by their freed minds. This being so, anthropology 
could not anymore have human nature as its subject because there was no such 
thing. Like history, social and cultural anthropology could then only be an 
assemblage of anecdotes about this and that. And this is what it has become and 
what has produced the heterogeneous list of interests of the Berkeley 
Anthropology department. To use the title of an older history of the subject, in a 
somewhat different way than it was meant, anthropology moved from the study 
of "ape to angels" (Hays 1958). 
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The contemporary situation seems therefore to be one where evolutionism has 
been dismissed and diffusionism has won, thereby leaving anthropology without 
the only centre it could have: the study of human beings. 
This is well illustrated by the form of most contemporary anthropology teaching. 
At the risk of caricature, anthropology courses, whether introductory or more 
specialised, have in common the following general structure. They begin with a 
historical section, where the general theories of early anthropologists are 
explained. These may be from long ago, such as those of Boas, Durkheim, 
Westermark or Morgan, or, more likely, from the middle distance, Mauss, 
Radcliffe Brown, Malinowski, Van Wouden, or Levi-Strauss. Then, what is wrong 
with these theories is demonstrated, usually by means of ethnographic examples, 
and there the matter rests. Students are, therefore, left with a feeling of having 
little to say about the subject in general. They have lost a few misleading illusions 
in the process, which is all to the good; but, also, more insidiously, they have 
learnt that the very attempt to generalise about human beings -as the historical 
figures did- was, in and of itself, wrong. To be a good anthropologist thus seems 
to require to have learnt not to ask the questions which the Ranomena villagers, 
or our psycholinguist, ask. 
This largely negative stance is not simply due to the way anthropology has 
developed within the academy. It is also due to the non-academic reputation of 
early evolutionary theories. 
Ideas and publications proposing a unilineal evolution of human societies, going 
through a fixed number of stages, greatly antedates the academic anthropological 
evolutionists. But, probably, in part because these were so much in accord with 
their time, the works of the founders had an extraordinary contemporary 
influence, though often, somewhat indirectly, through such writers as Freud, Marx 
and several influential literary figures. The late nineteenth century and early 
twentieth was thus the period when anthropology, as an academic subject, 
although a very young academic subject, had an enormous impact on intellectual 
life. Since then, however, save for a few moments that, for a short time, seem to 
buckle the trend, the general influence of contemporary anthropology has 
declined. The work of more recent anthropologists, especially those whose work 
has come out since the 1950's, with the possible exception of that of Margaret 
Mead on sex and Levi-Strauss on structuralism, has had little influence on the 
main intellectual currents of the time. 
On the other hand, outside anthropology departments, the influence of the 
founders of the discipline has continued unabated, distilled in various forms in the 
general culture in which we bathe. The idea of an evolutionary sequence of 
societies, customs, laws, religions, morals, extremely similar to that set out by 
the evolutionist anthropologists, is still with us, even though sometimes a little 
disguised for the sake of political correctness. Thus, few people flinch at the 
implications of remarks such as "It is particularly shocking to witness such 
brutality in the twentieth century and in an advanced country". Even more 
surprising is the fact that books such as those of Tylor, Morgan or Frazer, which 
in their times sold far far more than any contemporary anthropology works, are 
still in print and still much read today. The reason for the continuing influence of 
these writers and the relative lack of influence of their successors is not difficult 
to find. It is simply that these early authors gave fundamental answers, however 
unacceptable, to the questions asked by the Malagasy villagers and by our 
colleagues in other disciplines, while more recent anthropologists do not. 
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The fact that professional anthropologists live in a world where theories they 
consider obsolete still dominate, while their own voices are little heard, has a 
reinforcing effect on the negative theoretical character of teaching. Every year 
university anthropologists are faced with new generations of students who have, 
or are imagined to have, consciously or unconsciously, absorbed anthropological 
evolutionist theories. Thus the teaching of anthropology is often envisaged by the 
professionals as an endless fight against erroneous doctrines held by the 
neophytes and which, ironically, were largely encouraged, if not created, by their 
discipline's forebears. 
But there is yet a further element in the educational scene which influences 
anthropology and pushes it still further in this same direction. 
Apart from the general impression that attempting to formulate general theories 
is a bad and obsolete habit, another message comes through, loud and clear, in 
the teaching of anthropology. One of the very bad things which the early 
anthropologists did, was to have placed their own values above those of other 
cultures, thereby seeing the process of evolution as necessarily progressing 
towards peoples such as themselves and towards types of societies such as their 
own. It followed that those most unlike themselves were rude primitives of the 
very lowest order. To do this sort of thing is called ethnocentrism and is very 
wicked. Such a message is easily and well received by the kind of students who 
are likely to choose anthropology and who come from a world where the evils of 
racism and intolerance have been all too clear. 
However, this rejection is far from unproblematic. When we look more closely, we 
find all kinds of elements treacherously merged with this notion of ethnocentrism. 
The charge that the evolutionist anthropologists were somehow revelling in the 
inferiority of those they chose to call primitives and that this legitimated violence 
against them is anachronistic and grossly unfair and, ironically, ethnocentric, 
since it ignores the context and language of their time. For example, Tylor, the 
founder of British anthropology, was very active in the anti-slavery movement 
and Morgan, the founder of American anthropology, was much involved in 
supporting Indian rights. Indeed, the real political involvement of the founders of 
anthropology contrasts with its absence on the part of many contemporary 
anthropologists who willingly loudly denounce evolutionism as part of their 
general campaign for political correctness. 
Also involved in the notion of ethnocentrism is the warning against seeing people 
of other cultures through the lens of our own values. In fact, two elements should 
be distinguished here. The first is a methodological point. It is an injunction to 
anthropologists that the task of interpretation requires as much as possible an 
effort of imagination. We must try to see others as though from their point of 
view in order to understand them. Few would quarrel with the benefits of such a 
stance. But, closely intertwined with this, is the idea that the avoidance of 
ethnocentrism is not just a matter of a temporary suspension of disbelief, but an 
absolute injunction, i.e., that we should never judge or evaluate others by the 
categories or standards of our culture. This proposal leads inevitably to moral and 
cognitive relativism. 
The ethical problems of moral relativism are fundamental and have often been 
discussed, notably by de Martino (1977). Here, however, I want to concentrate 
on the theoretical, or perhaps the rhetorical, problems involved in cognitive 
relativism. 
Cognitive relativism is often adopted without much theoretical scrutiny since it is 
based on a gut reaction to any attempt at generalisation. Generalisations are felt 
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to be nothing but mere products of the particular cultural configuration of the 
ethnographer, who is situated, as he or she inevitably is, at a given time in a 
given place. The demonstration that this is so is a source of great satisfaction to 
the profession as it demonstrates the superiority of anthropologists over lay 
people. What they think of as the bedrock of their ideas, is shown to be but the 
shifting sand of a unique historical conjuncture in a unique location. 
There is no doubt that this kind of criticism of much theory, especially social 
science theory, is one of the major contributions that anthropologists have made 
to scientific enquiry. However, such a position can easily slip into a much more 
radical claim that the very attempt to generalise about human beings, however 
subtly done, is always going to be wrong because it will always be nothing but the 
projection of the anthropologists' way of thinking. This inevitably implies the idea 
that anthropology as a generalising science about human beings is a mere illusion 
of particular cultures, or to put it another way, that the very idea of human 
beings as a subject of study is shown, once again, to be flawed. 
Of course, such a stance is rarely made explicit, because, if it were it would run 
into the well known internal contradictions which absolute relativism inevitably 
creates, i.e. that such a conclusion is also a particularistic cultural mirage 
(Sperber 1982, Gellner 1982). Thus we have instead something that might 
almost be called an anthropological mood rather than a theory. However, all the 
same the damage is done, and the damage is that any anchor for a subject such 
as anthropology is abandoned, which amounts to a declaration that the discipline 
is about nothing. It is not surprising then that anything goes. 
We thus find ourselves in the present ridiculous situation. On the one hand when 
the question: "Is there a common human nature?" is asked, most people, 
although they probably will consider it rather silly, will answer without hesitation 
in the affirmative, but, on the other, anthropologists will very much want to 
answer no, but wont dare to, so they will just go into hiding. Perhaps, part of the 
reason for this embarrassment is that a straight negation, taken together with 
what being a member of an anthropology department would seem to mean 
literally, would imply arguing themselves out of a job. 
Of course, denying the unity of mankind is not new in anthropology. However, 
those who previously advocated such a position, the so called polygenists of the 
nineteenth century, argued that mankind was made up of unrelated species and 
consequently approved of slavery and the hunting of Australian Aborigines as 
though they were wild animals (Stocking 1987). These might not be the 
precursors the present day anti anti relativists would wish to claim. 
This further surreptitious abandonment of a notion of human nature, involved in 
the condemnation of ethnocentrism in the dialectics of teaching combines 
dangerously smoothly with the negative stance that the history of the subject has 
produced. These two elements therefore reinforce each other in an obscure way 
and produce the situation I described at the outset of this lecture, where, when 
faced by the kind of request of our psycholinguist, anthropologists, instead of 
attempting to respond, go into what looks like a silent sulk wrapped in an aura of 
self-righteousness. 
Inevitably, the questioners, whether they are academic colleagues or Malagasy 
villagers, are less impressed with such a stance than the anthropologists would 
like them to be. And so, they simply go elsewhere to look for answers to their 
anthropological questions. And much is available, in the works of writers whose 
academic affiliations are very varied, but which I label here, for the sake of 
simplicity, as the new evolutionists. Thus, to mention only some of the most well 
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known, we have Richard Dawkins, a zoologist, explaining kinship (1976), Rem~ 
Girard, a scholar of literature, expounding on the origin of religion (1972), 
Stephen Pinker, a psycho-linguist, telling us about totemism (2002) and Matt 
Ridley, a scientific journalist, telling us about incest (2003). The impact of such 
works can easily be seen if we look at the sales of their books, a commercial 
success which contrasts dramatically with that of my colleagues and my own. 
These books have sold in hundreds of thousands. In other words, they have had 
the same kind of diffusion as the work of Tylor, Frazer or Morgan had and they 
probably have a similar influence. The reason is not difficult to find; it is simply 
that these works seem to offer answers to the universal questions of a public 
hungry for anthropology. 
We may well ask what is the reaction of professional anthropologists to such 
competitors. The answer is almost none at all. They consider these new 
evolutionists theories with so much distaste that they seem to be almost unaware 
of their existence. Thus, most of my anthropological colleagues seem never to 
have heard of Dawkins' proposal about the nature of culture, or of the word 
memes which he had coined to express it, and if they have, they often fail to 
know what it means. This is at a time when, if you type the word on Google you 
obtain 1,280,000 entries. 
The point is not only that, anthropologists do not produce the same kind of works 
as those of Pinker or Dawkins, they also seem to have nothing to say about them. 
They have withdrawn from the fray to a place where they produce a large number 
of studies, some good, some bad, about this and that, without any guiding reason 
or without any attempt at building up a coherent body of knowledge. It is, as 
though they consider the proposals made in this extra disciplinary anthropology 
so beneath them, that they are unwilling to acknowledge its very existence. 
Part of the distaste of anthropologists towards such work is not simply arrogance; 
it is the feeling that they have seen it all before. Indeed, when we turn to the 
writings of these new evolutionists, we usually find exactly the same problems 
that anthropologists have demonstrated and denounced throughout the twentieth 
century in the work of the founders. For, in the work of these writers, we come 
across, for example, the old easy assumption that contemporaries with simple 
technology are fossils of an earlier age, that human groups form distinct empirical 
entities, that there are obvious and necessary connections between technology 
and such things as ancestor worship etc. 
Most fundamental of all, however, is the assumption that internal characteristics 
of human nature can be used directly to account for specific cultures and 
histories. It is a bit as if someone proposed to account for the pattern of motor 
traffic in Amsterdam with an explanation of how the internal combustion engine 
functions. In this way these writers are simply repeats of the old evolutionists, 
although they sometimes modify their position by according some place to 
particular cultures and historical conjunctures. But, in the end, these are seen as 
merely superficial and hiding an unchanging and unchangeable universal base. 
The reaction of contemporary anthropologists is to repeat the totally legitimate 
diffusionist points. It sometimes seems as though we were doomed to endlessly 
repeat the same confrontation between theories based on unacceptable and often 
superficial views of human nature, but which are nevertheless listened to, and 
non-theories which are little more than avoiding saying anything and which are 
therefore ignored. 
But is this bind really necessary? I think not, and the first step in freeing 
ourselves from this endless to and fro is to note that the diffusionist/evolutionist 
dichotomy carries with it quite unnecessary baggage. The evolutionists implicitly 
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see human nature as a deterministic procrustean bed which makes particularistic 
history either impossible or a superficial irrelevance. The diffusionists replace 
evolutionist determinism with such immaterial disembodied phenomena as 
cultural traits and more recently symbols, representations and dialogues. Thus 
the diffusionist reaction to evolutionism bundles together a profound point about 
the nature of human beings, i.e. the revolutionary historical implications of the 
kind of brain possessed by Homo Sapiens and a quite different, and indeed 
contrary, totally unexamined philosophical jump from materialism to the purest of 
idealism. An idealism which means that questions such as: what are human 
beings like? cannot even be approached. 
The point is really quite simple. It is essential that the implications of the 
continual transformation of people in the complex cumulative socio-historical 
process, best understood as complex communication, be made central, as indeed 
it was for the diffusionists. And, that consequently we recognise that human 
history cannot be seen as the fulfilling of a once and forever given potential, 
which inevitably implies unilineality and predictability. But it is equally essential 
that the recognition of this central fact about people does not remove our 
understanding of human history and culture to a place where people's bodies, 
minds and the world in which they exist, have somehow vaporised. 
And here, a third type of theory might help us, a theory in no way so fundamental 
as evolutionism and diffusionism, though it has sometimes pretended to be so. A 
position best thought of as a method, with a potential for theory, rather than a 
theory as such. I call this type of position functionalism, but again, as I did for 
evolutionism and diffusionism, I use the word in a wider and somewhat different 
manner than the way it is usually understood. Functionalism is a position that is 
not often given its due, partly because it was so clumsily and variously theorised. 
Also, I recognise and accept the often, if overrepeated and overfamiliar, criticism 
that have been made against theories which have been by self-proclaimed 
functionalists, such as the structuralism of Radcliffe-Brown's programmatic 
articles or Malinowski's teleological arguments. These criticisms, however, only 
apply to extreme formulations, which, in fact, were never very significant for 
actual studies. They do not concern me here. 
What I understand by functionalism is, above all, a commitment to seeing culture 
as existing in the process of actual people's lives, in specific places, as a part of 
the wider ecological process of life, rather than as a disembodied system of traits, 
beliefs, symbols, representations, etc. It is not accidental that such a position has 
developed together with the advocacy for long term field work and that it has 
waned with the latter's decline. This is because maintaining a focus on what has 
been rather misleadingly called the "embodiment" of life processes is difficult 
away from specific and closely watched instances. Such a stance, therefore, 
requires a constant effort. 
This is probably why, as I suggested above, functionalism, in the very general 
sense in which I am using the term here, has been losing ground of late and why 
it has been replaced by various theories of the diffusionism/culturalism type. This 
lack of interest in functionalism is also probably due to the fact that it has been 
such a European stance which has been drowned by imported theoretical 
American debates, endlessly stuck in the evolutionist/diffusionist controversy. 
However, the virtues of what I call functionalism are many. 
Its theoretical strength lies in its insistence on the complexity of life in particular 
places and at particular times, on the fact that in normal practice the many facets 
of human existence, which other sciences, such as politics, philosophy, 
economics, art, agriculture, kinship, medicine, psychology and so on ... separate 
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for the sake of clarity and simplicity, are inextricably bound together. For 
functionalism the mental exists in the practical, and both are conjoined functions 
of bodies in the wider ecology of life. 
Because of its insistence on local anchorings, functionalism cannot avoid facing 
frontally the particularism of human situations. In this it is like diffusion ism and 
unlike evolutionism. However, it is not subject to diffusionism's idealism, since it 
insists on seeing ideas, representations and values as occurring in the natural 
world of action and transformation, of production and reproduction. It requires, 
therefore, a form of epistemological monism, uniting people and the environment, 
the mental and the biological, nature and culture. Thus, it also resists the 
dichotomies of some of the modern evolutionists, who, wanting to take into 
account the reality of culture, end up with a type of dualism which sees 
individuals as partly made up of an immutable universal base, and an essentially 
different superficial, cultural historical, superstructure. 
Functionalism therefore recognises the inseparable combination created by the 
particularisms of the specificity of human history and the properties of natural 
being in the natural world. This having been said, however, it is not difficult to 
foresee the theoretical difficulty such a position creates. 
Quite simply by taking so many things into account and refusing to separate 
them, because they are not separate, one risks finding oneself unable to say 
much except noting how complicated and interconnected everything is. 
Functionalism is thus good at forcing us to look at the human world as it is and at 
forcing us to stop ignoring its unpredictable complexity. However, functionalism 
threatens to overwhelm by the complexity of the task it has set itself. The 
functionalist is thus often tempted to give superficial quick fix answers, as did 
Malinowski, at the end of his life, with his needs theory, or, to take refuge in the 
contemplation of ethnography for its own sake, when faced by the questions of 
non anthropologists, be they Malagasy or Dutchmen. 
It may thus appear that, if we define our object of study as the unique human 
combination of unified biological and historical factors, the task of theorising is 
simply too enormous for our discipline. The task is truly difficult but it need not 
make us despair. 
Let me return to the anecdote I began with. It concerned a psycholinguist who 
wanted to work in cooperation with anthropologists because she believed that her 
knowledge of the development of language and conceptualisation in children 
could contribute to anthropological enquiry, while, for her part, she would gain 
from what we knew. In this lecture I have argued that the reason why such co-
operation could not take place was because of the dogmatic refusal by 
anthropologists to accept that their ultimate aim is the study of human nature, 
the necessary point of contact between disciplines such as psychology and others, 
including ours, all concerned, with humans, with minds and bodies, living in 
natural environments. The refusal, however, is based on unexamined theoretical 
slights of hand, abetted by aspects of the character of the teaching of the subject 
in the university. 
However, if we recognise that our subject concerns the study of human nature, 
communication with many other scientific disciplines, also engaged in 
understanding in this same enterprise, becomes possible, disciplines such as 
psycholinguistics, for example, and many others. Of course, interdisciplinary 
communication will still be difficult, but there need not be impassable theoretical 
partitions. 
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Indeed, in this grand alliance, the special appointed theoretical task of 
anthropology, with its continual insistence on the actual life of specific people in 
specific places, may, precisely, be to try for ways to link the different human 
sciences. These may be separated for good methodological reasons, but heuristic 
divisions always threaten to gain a false reality. In the study of man there is a 
time for diversification but there is also a time for putting things together and this 
may be the difficult role of the discipline. 
From such a perspective, contrary to what the evolutionists imagined, it becomes 
obvious that anthropology cannot pretend, by itself, to give answers to the 
questions which most people, including the Zafimaniry sitting around a dying fire 
deep in the Malagasy forest, quite rightly ask of our discipline. But this will not be 
a reason for avoiding these requests by disdaining them. Indeed, anthropology 
should be uniquely well positioned to try to answer, but in so doing it will draw 
not only on what it has learnt, but always also with the help of these other 
disciplines which it will continually attempts to reconcile rather than shut out. You 
might be surprised that in this lecture I have so far not mentioned cognitive 
anthropology, but I hope that it is by now clear that all the theoretical ground 
clearing I have been engaged in in this lecture is above all intended in explaining 
to explain the need and the value of such this subject as I would like it to be. 
Finally, I want to take this opportunity to thank the Free University of Amsterdam 
for having given me the possibility to work with its exiting and varied 
anthropology department, something which I have already found exhilarating and 
which I look forward to continue in the future. The friendly and studious 
atmosphere has been a delight. I want to thank more particularly, Your 
Excellency, the Chancellor, and the members of the Board of Trustees of the Free 
University. I was much encouraged in coming here by my meetings with Dean 
Klandermans who smoothed all the difficulties involved in my affiliation. I owe 
most to Donna Winslow whose determination ensured my venue and to Andre 
Droogers who has made me feel so at home in the department he leads. I want 
to thank warmly Carolien Holleman and most particularly Anouk Nieuwland who 
has held my hand in my various uncomprehending dealings with Netherlands 
administrative culture. Finally, I want to say what a pleasure it is, and will be, to 
work with my long standing friend and colleague Sandra Evers. 
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